This article seeks to explain the challenge between Iran and United States, independent of the cause or time of occurrence, by providing a model to choose the optimal behavior. Presenting the model, the perspective theory is used to describe the action of the parties, and the space that governs this challenge; and the optimal answer is expressed with the Game Theory Approach. Prospect theory, which is used to improve the human behavioral pattern against the expectation value theory, due to the modified assumptions that the traditional approaches have them, makes a usable model which guarantee the output more reliable. The main question that this article seeks to answer is: what is the optimal pattern of Iran's behavior in the operating environment with U.S. conflict? In this regard, after explaining how Iran and the United States act during the game, it is demonstrated that the selected games of Iran and the United States - to obtain the least cost and inflict the most damage - are compatible with the Chicken game and the Prisoner's Dilemma respectively; So it was assumed that Iran chooses the Chicken game and the United States chooses Prisoner's Dilemma; and Finally, the US-Iran rocket conflict will be described base on these two games.
· نوربخش، س. ؛ غفوری، س. ، ملکی، ع. (۱۳۹۴)، به کارگیری نظریه بازی ها در تحلیل منازعه ج. ا. ایران و آمریکا با محوریت برنامه هسته‌ای ایران، مجله راهبرد، سال بیست و چهارم بهار 1394 شماره 74 ،صص: 89-132.
· نهاوندیان، م. ؛ لطفی، م.(۱۳۹۲)، نظریه بازیها و تحریم اقتصادی ایران (ارائهی مدل مفهومی) مطالعات دفاعی استراتژیک، تابستان 1392 - شماره 5، صص:39-68.
گلدانی، مهدی (۱۳۹۷)، الگویی برای تبیین بهینه رفتار اقتصادی کشورها در تقابلها نامتقارن قدرت با استفاده از نظریه بازیها و نظریه چشمانداز، دومین همایش ملی اقتصاد دفاع دانشگاه عالی دفاع ملی، زمستان 97.
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goldani, M. (2020). Describing the Optimal Behavior of Iran and The United States Conflict by means of Game Theory. Strategic Management Studies of National Defence Studies, 9(37), 114-142.
MLA
mahdi goldani. "Describing the Optimal Behavior of Iran and The United States Conflict by means of Game Theory", Strategic Management Studies of National Defence Studies, 9, 37, 2020, 114-142.
HARVARD
goldani, M. (2020). 'Describing the Optimal Behavior of Iran and The United States Conflict by means of Game Theory', Strategic Management Studies of National Defence Studies, 9(37), pp. 114-142.
VANCOUVER
goldani, M. Describing the Optimal Behavior of Iran and The United States Conflict by means of Game Theory. Strategic Management Studies of National Defence Studies, 2020; 9(37): 114-142.
